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Despite substantial increases in automobile insurance premiums in recent
years, most American insurers lose money in the private automobile insurance
market.' Although premiums increased three times faster than inflation
between 1984 and 1990,2 American private insurers lost $2.4 billion on
personal auto insurance between 1980 and 1988, while other lines of property
and casualty insurance gained $7.1 billion.3 A large portion of these losses
derives from state mandates requiring private companies to write insurance at
state regulated rates for drivers whom they deem too risky to insure
voluntarily. While some states have created government-operated insurance
programs, many of these programs have fared poorly, generating billion dollar
deficits.4
The number of uninsured motorists, estimated at 17 million in 1991, has
increased because some drivers could no longer afford insurance policies once
insurance premiums soared.5 In response, legislators and regulators have
increasingly held rates constant below expected claims, forcing insurers to
suffer financial losses when covering high risk drivers. Responding in turn,
some insurance companies resolved to leave the auto insurance market to avoid
such losses.
To leave the market, insurers cease accepting new business and renewing
existing policies. To prevent this exodus, two states-New Jersey and
Massachusetts-passed regulations restricting insurance companies'
withdrawal.6 In addition, California's Insurance Commissioner attempted to
1. A.M. BEST CO., BEST'S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES: PROPERTY-CASUALTY 272-80 (1991).
2. National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, 1990-1 NAIC PROC. 670, 671 (1989) (report of Robin
Campaniano, Hawaii Insurance Commissioner).
3. Auto Coverage Losses Mount, Bus. INS., Dec. 25, 1989, at 41 [hereinafter Losses Mount].
4. Both New Jersey and Massachusetts have program deficits of over $3 billion. See SEAN MOONEY,
AUTro INSURANCE: CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE 1990s 59 (1989); Jay Romano, New Law on Auto Insurance
Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMS, Mar. 18, 1990, § 12NJ, at 1.
5. See Fannie Weinstein, Bane of the Highway: Uninsured Motorists, INS. REV., Nov. 1991, at 32.
6. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 211, §§ 54.01-.06 (1991); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 22H (1991); Rule
of Operation 11, Commonwealth Automobile Reinsurers (Boston, Mass. 1991). The Commonwealth
Automobile Reinsurers is the mechanism through which insurers in Massachusetts discharge their statutory
duty to "cooperate ... [in providing] motor vehicle insurance to applicants who have been unable to obtain
[voluntary market] insurance." MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 113H (1991); NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 2-29
(1991).
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impose a difficult withdrawal procedure, but the California courts found that
the procedure violated the California Insurance Code.7 Because withdrawal
regulations essentially compel insurance companies to lose money selling auto
insurance, an insurance executive described one state's efforts as "capital
imprisonment.",
8
Withdrawal regulations subvert the very goals of available and affordable
insurance that they purport to achieve. Moreover, such regulations effect an
unconstitutional taking of property9 and a denial of substantive due process
rights.'" Part I of this Note describes the insurance crises that prompted
legislators and regulators in New Jersey, California, and Massachusetts to enact
withdrawal restrictions. Part II discusses these regulations in some detail, and
Part III analyzes their economic effects. It argues that, although in the short
run these provisions can compel insurance companies to bear the mounting
costs of auto insurance, in the long run they produce perverse effects. The
added costs and risks of the new regulations deter new insurance companies
from entering the automobile insurance market and reduce the capital available
to those companies that remain. Part IV examines the legal basis for
withdrawal restrictions and concludes that New Jersey's and Massachusetts'
regulations are unconstitutional. To address the soaring costs of auto insurance,
legislators instead must develop a comprehensive solution.
I. THE CURRENT AUTO INSURANCE MARKET
The auto insurance market and the manner in which it is regulated have
changed dramatically in the last twenty-five years. Before the 1970's, auto
insurance rate regulations set rate floors for premiums to prevent insurance
companies from becoming insolvent. In contrast, regulations now strive to keep
rates down-sometimes even below the costs the insurance company must pay
to provide such insurance-thereby forcing the companies to bear these rapidly
escalating costs." Between 1982 and 1991, auto insurance rates increased by
109.5%. However, during that same period, the main factors contributing to the
costs of auto insurance also increased at high rates: bodily injury claim costs
by 112.1%; hospital room prices by 112.2%; medical costs by 91.4%; auto
7. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gillespie, 785 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1990); see CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03(c)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1992).
8. Kathryn J. McIntyre, Industry Executives Face a Host of Pressing Concerns, BUS. INS., Oct. 22,
1990, at 82 (quoting William E. Thiele, President of the Continental Corp., referring to New Jersey).
9. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
10. "[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. See BANKS McDowELL, DEREGULATION AND COMPETrION IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 14
(1989) (discussing insurers' self-regulatory attempts to maintain minimum rates); Mark Pauly et al.,
Regulation and Quality Competition in the US Insurance Industry, in THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE
REGULATION: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 65, 74 (J6rg Finsinger & Mark V. Pauly eds., 1986).
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repair costs by 82.3%; and property damage claim costs by 79.6%.12 Many
drivers cannot afford the premiums necessary to cover the risks, especially
urban residents, who tend to have higher risk factors than suburban
residents. 3 High auto insurance rates, combined with compulsory auto
insurance laws, 4 squeeze drivers who, in turn, pressure legislators and
insurance regulators to ensure that auto insurance is available and
affordable. 5 In theory, the market could regulate rates, and those unable to
afford the insurance premiums could not drive. Although other insurance
markets place this burden of high rates on the insured, legislatures encounter
great political pressure to treat auto insurance differently.
This different treatment stemming from political demands has resulted in
regulation through rate ceilings. However, such ceilings merely cause insurance
companies to sell only to those insureds whose policies will be profitable at
the fixed rate. As a result, insurance becomes unavailable to many who want
it, and could even afford it, if the state did not enforce a rate ceiling.
In states where regulators do not fix maximum rates, consumers whom
most insurance companies consider undesirable risks can obtain insurance from
firms that specialize in insuring high-risk drivers. The market for normal-risk
drivers is called the standard voluntary market. Drivers who have higher than
normal risk factors obtain insurance from companies specializing in high-risk
drivers in the nonstandard voluntary market. 16 These companies stay in
business only by charging premiums that are higher, often considerably higher,
than those charged in the standard market. Even so, consumers benefit because
the insurance is available. 7 For instance, Texas, Wyoming, and Utah have a
free market system for auto insurance rates. In those states, between 10% and
20% of all drivers are insured in the nonstandard market and only a small
12. Special Report: Factors Influencing Auto Insurance on the Rise, EXECUTIVE LErrER (Ins. Info.
Inst., New York, NY), Apr. 27, 1992, at 1; see National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, 1989-1 NAIC PROC. 1,
5 [hereinafter 1989-1 NAIC PROC.] (statement of Rep. James Florio).
13. See Bethany A. Felter, Straightening Out the Auto Insurance Mess: National Association of
Independent Insurers Annual Conference, BEST'S REv., PROP.-CASUALTY INS. ED., Dec. 1989, at 106. Two
factors increase insurance losses in cities as compared to suburban areas: 1) inner city residents tend to be
poorer than suburban residents; and 2) urban areas have more cars per square mile. Because urban
environments have so many cars concentrated in a relatively small space, states with large urban centers
have the highest insurance rates, and thus the worst problems with auto insurance. See David N. Grubb,
Solving the Auto Insurance Crisis in New Jersey 20 (Apr. 10, 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (Grubb is Special Deputy Commissioner with the New Jersey Department of Insurance.).
14. See Compulsory Auto Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., Jan. 1992 (Ruth Gastel ed.) (stating that forty-
two states and the District of Columbia have compulsory auto insurance laws).
15. Most legislators and scholars focus on the affordability and availability of auto insurance because
these factors are of primary concern to consumers. See, e.g., California Initiative Statute 103 (Prop. 103),
§ 2 reprinted in Proposition 103 and Related Issues, INS. INFO. INST., Dec. 1991 (Ruth Gastel ed.); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992); National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, 1991-2 NAIC PROC.
50, 90 (1991) (statement of Roger M. Moak, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the Insurance
Services Office).
16. MOONEY, supra note 4, at 21.
17. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 77-78 (14th ed. 1992) (showing how shortages of goods
result whenever a maximum price is set below the market price).
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percentage of drivers need coverage in the involuntary market, 8 made up of
those drivers who cannot find coverage in either the standard or nonstandard
markets. Setting maximum rates undermines the nonstandard market because
companies serving high risk insureds cannot charge rates high enough to cover
costs and therefore must exit the market. In states without nonstandard
markets, the number of drivers in the involuntary market has increased
dramatically.' 9 When insurers are allowed to charge rates corresponding to
risk, most drivers are able to buy insurance in the voluntary market, and the
burden of insuring the involuntary market decreases.
By holding rates down, and thus increasing the size of the involuntary
market, states create an expensive problem for themselves-they must meet the
needs of these drivers. Though a variety of approaches is possible, each is
costly and potentially inefficient. By enforcing compulsory insurance laws in
a lax manner, states enable drivers simply not to buy insurance. Yet the
inadequacy of this solution-both for the driver and for society-becomes
evident when the driver has an accident. States often deal with drivers shut out
of the voluntary market by offering insurance themselves or by assigning such
drivers to private insurance companies. Forty-two states and the District of
Columbia use auto insurance plans in which the involuntary market is split up
among the insurers that service the voluntary market.20 Some states employ
joint underwriting associations, state-mandated pooling mechanisms through
which all auto insurance companies share the premiums and losses of the
involuntary market. Similarly, some states organize reinsurance facilities that
accept assignments of unacceptable risks from private insurance companies and
then allocate the premiums and the losses to the private insurers. Still other
states run their own insurance systems, while requiring private auto insurance
companies to pay the costs.2' All these plans require massive infusions of
state resources and often operate at huge deficits.22
Rate ceilings not only saddle the state with the expensive task of insuring
the expanded involuntary market, but also increase the burdens on voluntary
market drivers because insurers must use the premiums of low-risk drivers to
subsidize high-risk drivers.' In 1986, Massachusetts auto insurers paid $566
million to subsidize the involuntary market-an average added cost of $363 to
each voluntary market policyholder.24 In 1989, New Jersey charged each
18. MOONEY, supra note 4, at 53.
19. See Pauly et al., supra note 11, at 104-05.
20. Compulsory Auto Insurance, supra note 14.
21. See Henry G. Hager, Is Pa.'s New Auto Law Working, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY
ED., Oct. 1, 1990, at 23; Paul E. Wish, Review & Preview: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, BEST's
REV., PROP.-CASUALTY INS. ED., Jan. 1988, at 26.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 39 & 60.
23. See Losses Mount, supra note 3; Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, Auto Insurers, Regulators Clash,
CHRISTIAN Sl. MONITOR, Oct. 7, 1991, at Econ. 7.
24. MOONEY, supra note 4, at 57.
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driver in the voluntary market a surcharge of $222 to subsidize the involuntary
market.2 A vicious cycle ensues. Insurance companies raise rates on low risk
drivers to subsidize high risk drivers. But in response to the higher rates, more
marginal low-risk drivers choose to forgo insurance or to enter the involuntary
market, thereby depriving insurance companies of some of their consumer base
and increasing the burden on the state-subsidized involuntary market.
Paradoxically, drivers sometimes prefer to enter involuntary market plans
because state regulators have held the premiums for involuntary insurance at
the same level as those of the voluntary market.26
As a result of these market distortions, private insurance companies have
incurred considerable losses on auto insurance policies. Many desire to leave
the auto insurance market altogether.27 State regulators and legislators need
insurance companies to continue writing policies in their state. If insurance
companies leave the market, the legislature will have to make insurance
available through a state plan or face voter anger. Moreover, states faced with
huge deficits from state-run involuntary market insurance plans often wish to
force private insurance companies to finance these deficits. This frustrates the
state's desire to make auto insurance available. In order to keep the insurers
in the market, some states have enacted statutes and regulations making it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for private insurance companies to leave
the auto insurance market.28 State regulation of insurance companies-at least
in New Jersey, California, and Massachusetts-is becoming broader, treating
the insurers like public utilities.29
II. THE ENACTMENT OF WITHDRAWAL REGULATIONS
New Jersey, Massachusetts, and California have the highest automobile
insurance premiums in the United States.30 In addition to imposing new costs
on insurers, these states have enacted regulations and statutes limiting the
ability of insurers to withdraw from the market. As will be argued in Part III,
25. Grubb, supra note 13, at 15.
26. Grubb, supra note 13, at 20. Although drivers could leave the state in response to high auto
insurance premiums, it is unlikely that someone would incur the significant expenses associated with
moving in order to find lower insurance rates.
27. Eight companies have already withdrawn from New Jersey. Nine others are in the process of
withdrawing while at least seven more are trying to get approval for their withdrawal plans. In
Massachusetts, thirteen companies have withdrawn from the auto insurance market and another two are in
the process of withdrawing. See infra notes 47, 65-67 and accompanying text; see also Lisa S. Howard,
NAIC Examines Reasons for Market Withdrawals, NAT'L UNDERWRrrER, PROP. & CASUALTY ED., Jan. 7,
1991, at 2; National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, 1991-1 NAIC PROC. 815 (1990) (statement of Patricia
Borowski, Professional Insurance Agents).
28. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
29. See Orin S. Kramer, Solvency and Rate Suppression: In the Insurance Industry, BEST'S REV.,
PROP.-CASUALTY INS. EMrrloN, Mar. 1992, at 25.
30. See Karen Tumulty, N.J. 's Escalating Auto Insurance Costs Trigger a California-Style Revolt, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. i1, 1990, at A28.
1993] 1435
The Yale Law Journal
the enactment of these regulations will only worsen the already poor situations
in these states.
A. New Jersey
New Jersey has the highest auto insurance premiums in the country.31 In
1972, New Jersey passed a compulsory auto insurance law32 requiring drivers
to buy a higher level of insurance coverage than required by most other
states.33 As a result of this law, auto insurance premiums increased 200% by
1983. 3' Even with these increased rates, insurers were unable to cover losses,
but regulators refused to allow rate increases sufficient to cover insurance
operating and administrative costs. The number of drivers in the involuntary
market rose from 9% in 1970 to 53% in 1989. Rates set for the involuntary
market remained at the same level as for the voluntary market. 35 New Jersey
has set the rate of return for auto insurance at 3.5%.36 Auto insurers incurred
private passenger liability insurance losses of -3.5%, -3.1% and -6.1% as a
percentage of direct premiums earned in 1988, 1989, and 1990, respectively.
They had a return on net worth in auto insurance of -3.7%, -3.0% and -6.1%
in the same respective years.37
In 1983, newly enacted legislation relieved the private insurers from
bearing part of the cost of the involuntary market. The state established a Joint
Underwriting Association (JUA) to service the involuntary market and funded
it with a surcharge placed on all policies sold in the voluntary market and with
funds obtained from vehicle violations and convictions. 38 The insurance
companies paid for a portion of the surcharge on insurance policies in the form
of reduced profits. However, the insurers, in theory, were not responsible for
any deficit resulting from this scheme. The initial funding proved insufficient;
by 1990, the JUAs deficit had grown to over $3 billion.39 In 1989, the New
Jersey Department of Insurance found that high insurance rates in New Jersey
were caused by high accident rates and inefficiencies in the no-fault law.4"
It blamed the JUA's deficit on insufficient premiums. The same study found
that JUA drivers had 68% more accidents per car than voluntary market
31. 1989-1 NAIC PROC., supra note 12, at 5.
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-1 to 39:6A-35 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992).
33. MOONEY, supra note 4, at 57-58.
34. Grubb, supra note 13, at 17; 1989-1 NAIC PROC., supra note 12, at 5.
35. Grubb, supra note 13, at 17; 1989-1 NAIC PROC., supra note 12, at 5.
36. NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 3-16.10 (1991).
37. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, REPORT ON PROFITABILITY BY LINE BY STATE 1990 (1991)
[hereinafter NAIC REPORT ON PROFrrABILrrY] (Profitability Results-Six Year Summary: New Jersey).
In contrast, New Jersey insurance companies earned profits of 12.5%, 9.6%, and 8.2% on all lines of
insurance sold during each respective year. The total return on net worth for all lines of New Jersey
insurance, including auto insurance, during the same period was 18.5%, 12.9%, and 10.8%. Id.
38. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:30E-1 to 17:30E-24 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
39. Romano, supra note 4.
40. Grubb, supra note 13, at 18.
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drivers, but that rates were about the same as in the voluntary market. These
rates remained approximately the same between 1984 and 1989 despite
inflation and increased accident frequency.
4
In response to these excesses, James Florio made reform of the insurance
industry a cornerstone of his 1989 gubernatorial campaign.42 Soon after he
took office, the legislature passed the Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act
(FAIR).43 This legislation dissolved the JUA and transferred its two million
policyholders to the Market Transition Facility (MTF). The rates set for the
MTF were initially set at the same level as the JUA, and thus, too low to
cover costs. Under Florio's plan, drivers covered by the MTF switch gradually
into the voluntary market so that only 10% of the drivers remain in the MTF
by September 1993. These remaining drivers will be placed in an assigned risk
pool similar to that in place before the JUA. Two studies have determined that
the MTF would run up a deficit of $1 billion by the time of its dissolution if
rates were held at the same level as the JUA." Although FAIR requires the
Insurance Commissioner to set rates so that the MTF is self-sustaining, it also
requires private insurers to pay off $1.4 billion of the debt incurred by the JUA
and any debts incurred by the MTF if it is not self-sustaining.45 In March
1990, in response to the considerable costs that Florio's plan promised for
insurance companies, several major insurance companies, including Allstate
Insurance Company, the largest insurer in New Jersey,46 announced that they
no longer wanted to write auto insurance in New Jersey.47
41. See Grubb, supra note 13, at 20; see also Kramer Associates, Perspective on the New Jersey
Residual Market Experience (1990) (unpublished report, on file with author).
42. See Eric N. Berg, Largest Insurer in New Jersey, Allstate, Seeks to End Coverage, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1991, at Al; Bruce Frankel, Allstate Says It's Leaving N.J., Cites Florio's Reform, USA TODAY,
Sept. 18, 1991, at 3A.
43. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:33B-1 to 17:33B-63 (West Supp. 1992); Romano, supra note 4.
44. Jay Romano, Auto Insurance: Do the Fixes Need Fixing?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, § 12NJ,
at 1.
45. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:30A-16(b), 17:33B-1, 17:33B-2(g), 17:33B-51 (vest Supp. 1992).
46. In 1990, Allstate had 15.9% of the market. Romano, supra note 4.
47. Id. Companies that are currently in the process of withdrawing and have had their withdrawal plans
approved include Colonial Penn Group (.5% market share), CIGNA (1.4% market share), American
Policyholders (<1% market share), Crum & Forster (.5% market share), and John Hancock Group (.4%
market share). Other companies waiting to have their plans approved include Commercial Union Insurance
Company (.1% market share), Hartford Insurance Group (1.5% market share), Home Insurance Company
(.4% market share), and Sentry Insurance Group (.2% market share). Several major companies, including
Geico, Unigard, Nationwide, and Safeco, left New Jersey several years ago because of poor profits, but they
had small market shares. See New Jersey Insurance News Service (Mar. 1983) (unpublished news release,
on file with author); Telephone Interview with John Tiene, Account Manager, New Jersey Insurance News
Service (Sept. 2, 1992); Berg, supra note 42; Best DataBase Serv., New Jersey: All Private Pass. Auto, P/C
Experience By State (By Line), at 14 (1991) (on file with author). Although the companies exiting the
market now seem to have small market shares, most auto insurance companies in New Jersey insure less
than 5% of the market. In December 1992, Allstate announced that it would remain in New Jersey for two
more years in return for a rate increase of 6.5%. In addition, Allstate has agreed to drop several lawsuits
against New Jersey and will pay the state $75 million to help cover the JUA's deficit. Wayne King, Auto
Insurer Reaches Pact in New Jersey, N.Y. TIIES, Dec. 15, 1992, at BI.
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In April 1991, under FAIR, the Insurance Commissioner adopted new rules
restricting the withdrawal of insurance companies from New Jersey.48 These
rules give the Insurance Commissioner significant discretion in fashioning
withdrawal schedules for insurers. In order to withdraw, an insurer must
submit a detailed plan for withdrawal containing an estimate of future claims
against the company, the probable impact of its withdrawal on the market, the
cause for the withdrawal, and certain actuarial information.4 9 This information
allows the Commissioner to determine which provisions of the withdrawal
statute should be applied to the withdrawing insurer, a determination that is left
to the Commissioner's discretion. The Commissioner can require an insurer to
give up all insurance licenses in New Jersey in order to withdraw from one
market." For example, to withdraw from the auto insurance market, a
company may also have to cease writing other more profitable types of
insurance, such as fire insurance. Once a company has withdrawn, it cannot
reenter the New Jersey market for up to five years without the Commissioner's
permission."1 If the withdrawal involves private passenger auto insurance, the
Commissioner can require that the insurer remain in the state for up to five
years or until the withdrawing carrier has been able to place all its business
with another insurer, whichever comes first. At the end of five years, if
alternative coverage cannot be found, the insurer may start issuing nonrenewal
notices.5 While withdrawing, the insurer must accept the quota of drivers
from the MTF that the Commissioner assigns to it.
53
The New Jersey courts have held all provisions of the Act constitutional,
provided that the Commissioner enforces them so as to provide insurers a fair
rate of return. The insurers have challenged the FAIR provisions forcing them
to pay the debt of the JUA without passing this debt onto the insureds,54 the
measures requiring them to insure the drivers in the JUA,55 and the laws
forcing insurance companies that do not write auto insurance to help pay the
JUA's debt.56 In addition, Twin City Fire Insurance Company has claimed
that withdrawal regulations requiring an insurer to give up all lines of
insurance in order to withdraw from the auto insurance market are
unconstitutional violations of the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and
the Equal Protection Clause.57 Twin City also objected to the retroactive
48. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 2-29 (1991).
49. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tiL 11, §§ 2-29.2 to 2-29.4 (1991).
50. NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 2-29.3(c) (1991).
51. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 2-29.3(t) (1991).
52. NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 2-29.5(a)() (1991).
53. NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 2-29.5(a)(2) (1991).
54. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191 (NJ. 1991).
55. In re Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 591 A.2d 631 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), cert. denied, 599
A.2d 162 (NJ. 1991), cert. denied sub non. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fortunato, 112 S. Ct. 1244 (1992).
56. In re American Reliance Ins. Co., 598 A.2d 1219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), cert. denied,
606 A.2d 369 (NJ. 1992).
57. In re "Plan for Orderly Withdrawal from New Jersey" of Twin City Ins. Co., 609 A.2d 1248, 1257
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application of the withdrawal scheme since the company had submitted its
withdrawal application after the announcement of the FAIR Act but before the
enactment of the regulations. Nevertheless, the New Jersey courts found the
regulations constitutional.58
B. Massachusetts
Massachusetts also has enacted strict withdrawal regulations for auto
insurance companies. Massachusetts law forces insurers to charge insureds
premiums based on factors which often do not reflect the expected losses of
that particular insured.59 The state serves its involuntary market with a
reinsurance pool, but because of inadequate rates, the pool has had a deficit of
over $500 million per year, totaling over $3 billion since the inception of the
system.6° In 1988, 1989, and 1990, respectively, Massachusetts auto insurers
had losses as a percentage of direct premiums earned of -0.5%, -1.0%, and
-2.5% and returns on net worth of -0.8%, -1.3%, and -3.1%.61 Under
Massachusetts regulations, in order to withdraw from the auto insurance
market, a company licensed to write auto insurance in the state must submit
a detailed withdrawal plan for the Commissioner's approval.62 However, the
Insurance Commissioner. has the statutory right to suspend a withdrawing
company's license to write any insurance in Massachusetts if, at a hearing, the
Commissioner determines that the withdrawing company acted other than to
protect its solvency.63 Another restriction is Commonwealth Automobile
Reinsurers (CAR) Rule 11 B.3, which states that if a withdrawing automobile
insurer wishes to keep its other licenses in the State of Massachusetts, it must
pay its share of the involuntary market assessments for the three years
following its withdrawal from the auto insurance market.64 Before the
enactment of this rule, several insurance companies had withdrawn from
Massachusetts after negotiating terms with the Department of Insurance.
61
(NJ. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993); see supra notes 9, 10 for text of Takings Clause and Due
Process Clause, respectively. The Equal Protection Clause states, "nor shall any State ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the constitutional issues involved.
59. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 113H (1991) (Commissioner may establish rate categories for insurers);
see also Douglas Bailey, Study Blames Regulators for High Auto Rates, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30, 1989,
at 69.
60. Douglas Bailey, Car Insurance: Free Market?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1989, Econ. 21; MOONEY,
supra note 4, at 59.
61. NAIC REPORT ON PROFITABILITY, supra note 37 (Profitability Results-Six Year Summary:
Massachusetts). On all lines of insurance during these years, Massachusetts insurers earned profits of 5.6%,
5.4%, and 6.1% and a return on net worth of 10.5%, 9.9%, and 10.2%. Id.
62. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 211, §§ 54.01-54.06 (1991).
63. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 22H (1991).
64. Rule of Operation 11, supra note 6.
65. These companies include: Peerless (which is involved in continuing litigation), Shelby, Fireman's
Fund (which paid $45 million), General Accident (which has not yet reached a settlement), Reliance, and
Allstate (which is still engaged in litigation). Telephone Interview with Daniel Judson, Deputy General
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Allstate Insurance Company announced its withdrawal in 1988, stating that it
had lost $115 million over five years in the Massachusetts auto insurance
market.66 Under various CAR Rules, Royal, St. Paul, Cigna, Chubb, Central
Mutual, Aetna, and ITF Hartford have all withdrawn from the auto insurance
market. Crum & Forster and USF&G are currently negotiating with the
Department of Insurance for approval of their withdrawals.67
The Massachusetts courts have upheld the constitutionality of the state's
withdrawal provisions. In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
ruled that the Commissioner's discretion to force a company to surrender all
of its other insurance licenses in order to withdraw from the auto insurance
market violated neither the company's equal protection nor its due process
rights and did not involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.68 In 1991, Reliance Insurance Company and several other insurers
informed the Insurance Commissioner that they were withdrawing from the
auto insurance market.69 Reliance claimed that since the companies were
withdrawing, they were no longer members of the reinsurance pool and did not
owe further payments. 70 An appellate court rejected the company's
reasoning."
In 1990, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company filed suit in federal court
claiming that § 22H and Rule 11 B.3 were unconstitutional.72 Aetna claimed
that, under the Massachusetts scheme, it would be compelled to pay $150
million over eight years to cover the reinsurance pool's debt.7 3 In 1991,
Massachusetts changed CAR Rule 11 B.3 to require that insurers only pay
three years of involuntary market assessments to retain their other licenses, as
opposed to the eight years previously required. As a result of this change, in
January 1992 Aetna agreed to pay $87.5 million to withdraw from the
Massachusetts auto insurance market.74
C. Califomia
In 1988, California passed "Proposition 103," a ballot initiative setting out
new rules for the insurance industry, including a 20% "rollback" or reduction
Counsel of Department of Insurance of Massachusetts (May 11, 1991).
66. Douglas M. Bailey, Allstate Move No Joke to Rest of Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 21, 1988,
at 20.
67. Telephone Interview with Daniel Judson, Deputy General Counsel of Department of Insurance of
Massachusetts (May 11, 1991).
68. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 363 N.E.2d 1087, 1098-99 (Mass. 1977).
69. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 581 N.E.2d 1027, 1028 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1033. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the constitutional issues.
72. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gailey, 753 F Supp. 46 (D. Mass. 1990). The State filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds that the rule had not yet been applied to Aetna. The court refused to grant the
motion.
73. d at 48.
74. Charles Stein, Aetna Quitting As Auto Insurer BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1992, at 16.
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of auto insurance rates. The initiative also provided that rates could only be
raised during the ensuing year if the insurer was "substantially threatened with
insolvency. 75 Nonrenewal of a policy was allowed only for "one or more of
the following reasons: (1) non-payment of premium; (2) fraud or material
misrepresentation affecting the policy or insured; (3) a substantial increase in
the hazard insured against." 76 The Insurance Commissioner's rules subjected
the insurance companies to essentially the same kind and intensity of
regulation as is applied to public utilities. Prior to Proposition 103, a
competitive market determined rates in California.77
California regulators have determined that auto insurers are entitled to
approximately a 10% return on investment, while public utilities receive
14%.7' The Insurance Commissioner justifies this determination by claiming
that 10% is the historic profit average for the auto insurance industry.
79
However, if this were in fact the average, it would not be necessary in a
competitive market to regulate the rates charged. In addition, it is inconsistent
to allow stockholders whose competitive business is not protected from failure
and loss of their investment a lower rate of return on their investment than
stockholders of a public utility receive. In 1988, California insurers suffered
losses of -1.4%, while in 1989 and 1990, they earned profits of 3.6% and
2.5%, respectively, as a percentage of direct premiums earned. They had
returns on net worth in the same years of -2.2%, 5.3% and 3.6%, significantly
below the administratively designated 10%. 0
With the exception of the nonrenewal policy in Proposition 103, no other
provisions of the law prevent a company from withdrawing from the auto
insurance market in California. An insurer may withdraw from the market by
discharging its liabilities in the state,8 ' publishing its notice of withdrawal,82
submitting to an inspection by the Insurance Commissioner, 3 and paying a
small processing fee.' The day before the vote on Proposition 103, Travelers
Indemnity Company and several other affiliated insurers submitted applications
for withdrawal in the statutory manner. To prevent these firms from exiting the
market, the Insurance Commissioner ruled that the companies could not send
out nonrenewal notices to their policyholders until they had been approved
75. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b) (Vest 1984 & Supp. 1992).
76. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03(c) (Vest 1984 & Supp. 1992).
77. Sylvia Nasar, No Quick Fix for the Auto-Insurance Mess, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 2,
1990, at 46.
78. Louise Kertesz, Insurers Protest Prop. 103 Rules, BUS. INS., Aug. 26, 1991, at 3.
79. In re Determination of Rate of Return, Leverage Factor, and Projected Yield for 1989 Rate
Calculations, File No. RCD-2 at 1-18 (Ins. Comm'n Ruling, Aug. 14, 1991).
80. NAIC REPORT ON PROFITABILITY, supra note 37 (Profitability Results-Six Year Summary:
California). California insurers earned profits on all lines of insurance of 8.7%, 8.3%, and 7.5% and return
on net worth of 13.7%, 12.4%, and 11.0% in each of the respective years. Id.
81. CAL. INS. CODE § 1071.5 (West 1972).
82. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1071, 1073 (West 1972).
83. CAL. INS. CODE § 1072 (vest 1972).
84. CAL. INS. CODE § 1076 (West 1972 & Supp. 1992).
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formally for withdrawal.8" The insurance companies filed suit, and the
Supreme Court of California rejected the Commissioner's position:
We find nothing in the language of the withdrawal statutes suggesting
that in the normal, case the withdrawal process is to be other than
simple and expeditious.
That language [of Proposition 103] plainly implied that the
mandatory renewal provision does not apply to insurers who employ
the statutory procedure for withdrawing from the California insurance
market.86
In so holding, the court rejected the Commissioner's attempt to make
withdrawal a complicated process.
A number of insurers have challenged the constitutionality of Proposition
103. Although the Supreme Court of California upheld most of the provisions,
it invalidated some parts of the initiative.87 The nonrenewal restrictions were
found to be constitutional. However, the court held that the provision
preventing the Commissioner from approving rate increases for one year unless
the insurer was threatened with insolvency was unconstitutional but severable
from the rest of the initiative. In upholding the 20% rate rollback, the court
imposed two conditions. First, the Commissioner could not order the rate
rollback without allowing a hearing on the adequacy of these rates. Second,
"[o]ver the long term, the state must permit insurers a fair return."88
Ill. EcONOMIC IMPACT OF WITHDRAWAL REGULATIONS
Currently, legislators and regulators in some states seek to regulate the
auto insurance market to ensure available and affordable coverage.89 Although
regulators and legislators can force insurance companies to bear losses in the
short run, in the long run the insurers will leave the market, thus undermining
the dual objectives of available and affordable insurance. An examination of
the economic incentives shows that this is the case.
A. Short Term Effects
Insurance companies in states with withdrawal restrictions must pay
assessments that cover involuntary market plan deficits and charge rates below
costs. Withdrawal restrictions prevent insurers from avoiding these costs by
85. Philip Hager, Court Asked to Limit Insurer's Right to Fold, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1989, at A24.
86. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gillespie, 785 P.2d 500, 506-07 (Cal. 1990).
87. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
88. Id. at 1255.
89. See supra note 15.
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leaving the auto insurance market. Such measures are only effective in shifting
the high costs of auto insurance onto insurance companies in the short run until
the insurers are able to satisfy the requirements to leave the market.
Until the insurer can exit the market, the company must operate under the
insurance commissioner's conditions. In a state like New Jersey, this means
that auto insurers will continue to suffer significant losses. New Jersey sets the
premiums insurers can charge below the insurer's expected cost. At the price
set by the Insurance Commissioner, the demand for insurance policies is
significantly higher than the number of policies that can be sold profitably at
that price, producing an excess demand for auto insurance policies.
In addition to keeping prices low, regulators want to make insurance
available for most drivers. In order to make insurance available, regulators
force insurers to sell more policies than they would otherwise sell at the
ceiling price. Regulators in New Jersey have done this, ordering each auto
insurer to absorb a portion of the drivers in the MTF. Thus, insurers suffer a
loss on each policy they are required to sell for which the price charged falls
short of the costs incurred. These losses continue until the insurer exits the
market.
How long an insurer must stay in a state varies with the type of regulation.
The restrictions in Massachusetts allow an insurer to withdraw from the auto
insurance market at any time, but in order to withdraw, the company must pay
a large fine or give up its other lines of insurance within the state.9" In
contrast, in New Jersey the Commissioner can force an insurer waiting to
withdraw to spend five years seeking alternative coverage for its policyholders.
Moreover, during that time the insurer must continue to accept drivers
transferred out of the involuntary market pool.91 Allstate, the largest insurer
in New Jersey, has sustained huge losses in the New Jersey auto insurance
market-$72 million last year and $450 million in the last twenty years.
92
Allstate will continue to bear such losses until the state allows it to withdraw
from the market. It is unlikely, if not impossible, that a company servicing a
large segment of the market will find alternative coverage for its insureds in
a market so feeble that it requires withdrawal restrictions.
When deciding whether to exit, insurance companies will weigh the losses
they now incur in the auto insurance market against the profits they will lose
as a result of a state's withdrawal requirements. For example, in New Jersey,
an insurer must decide if its losses in the auto insurance market are high
enough to justify relinquishing all other insurance licenses in that state. In
Massachusetts, a company will compare the fine it must pay to the profits it
earns in other lines of insurance before surrendering its license. Insurers in
90. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 52-53.
92. See Berg, supra note 42.
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these states do not have to consider the probability of bankruptcy and its
accompanying costs because the statutes and regulations allow the respective
insurance commissioners to relax the rules for companies in financial trouble.
B. Long Term Effects
Withdrawal regulations, assessments, and rate rollbacks increase the costs
and risks involved in doing business and make a company's profit projections
uncertain. Although insurance companies initially will have to bear the losses
the state imposes on them, eventually auto insurance will become harder and
more expensive to obtain.
As withdrawal regulations, assessments, and rate reductions decrease the
profit potential of the auto insurance business, fewer insurers will want to sell
auto insurance. Insurers contemplating entering the market will consider the
possibility that they will face large assessments from state involuntary plan
deficits and artificially low rates. In addition, regulations that condition market
exit on the surrender of all insurance licenses or the payment of a large fine
increase the costs of writing auto insurance and discourage prospective
business entrants. A new company will have to take these exit costs into
account when deciding whether to enter the market. An insurance company in
a state which does not yet have withdrawal regulations has an incentive to get
out of that line in order to avoid the risk that it will become subject to
regulations that impose increased costs. An insurance company already subject
to these regulations eventually will withdraw from the state if forced to operate
continually at a loss. If future entrants into the business are discouraged and
current insurers leave the market, competition will decrease. Insurance will
become harder to obtain.
The uncertainty of assessments, low rates, and withdrawal regulations not
only will make insurance harder to obtain but also will make it more
expensive. Suppose that in the future state regulators and legislators, deciding
that current practices are counter-productive, repeal withdrawal restrictions and
allow higher rates. Insurers still would be discouraged from entering the
market because of uncertainty about future regulatory decisions and the risk
that new restrictions will be imposed. For example, when New Jersey
established the JUA, auto insurers did not expect to be individually liable for
JUA claims or debts.93 The New Jersey courts subsequently held that
insurance companies-even those companies that do not sell auto
insurance-can be forced to pay these debts.94 The state has characterized the
assessed payments as loans, but since they are not official state debt, there is
93. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191, 207-08 (NJ. 1991); see also NJ.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17:30E-1 to 17:30E-24 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
94. In re American Reliance Ins. Co., 598 A.2d 1219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), cert. denied,
606 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1992).
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no guarantee that they will be repaid.9s Forcing insurers to pay this debt is
likely to cause more uncertainty than any other action the state may take in the
New Jersey insurance market. A major part of the JUA plan was that any
excess losses were to be made up by monies collected from fines and were not
the insurers' responsibility. Putting this burden on the insurers significantly
increased uncertainty in all insurance markets. While auto insurers did not
expect to be held responsible for the JUA deficit, insurers who did not sell
auto insurance had even less reason to guess that they would be responsible
for a deficit from auto insurance sales. California law requires insurers to
refund 20% of the rates they charged to customers in 1988 unless this refund
would leave the company without a reasonable return.96 However, only three
major companies have agreed to pay the refunds, while approximately eighty
insurers still are involved in litigation protesting the rebates.97
Insurance companies will respond to uncertainty by demanding a risk
premium to continue serving the market and to cover the risk that regulation
or legislation will raise their costs significantly. As a result, the cost of
supplying auto insurance will increase. This will cause a rise in the price of
insurance policies which will in turn cause fewer policies to be sold since
fewer drivers will be able to afford them. This chain reaction undermines the
professed goals of regulators. If premiums continue to be held at a level that
is artificially low relative to costs, less insurance will be available because
current insurers will exit the market and few new businesses will take their
place.
In defense of withdrawal restrictions, it has been argued that since auto
insurance companies benefit from the enforced consumption of their product
(due to state requirements that all drivers buy insurance) as well as from an
exemption from federal antitrust laws, 9 they should bear the burden of
supporting the drivers in the involuntary market. Although this argument shows
why it may be necessary to regulate the auto insurance market, it does not
support the imposition of withdrawal restrictions. If insurers would rather leave
the market than sell insurance under the conditions set out by the insurance
commissioners, presumably they find that the benefits of a large market of
drivers and exemption from the antitrust laws do not make up for the burdens
involved. Therefore, if the insurers desire to exit the market, regulators cannot
justify the implementation of withdrawal restrictions by pointing to the benefits
insurance companies are receiving.
95. In re Loans of N.J. Property Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 590 A.2d 210 (N.J. 1991).
96. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771
P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
97. See James F. Peltz, Insurance Chief Not Wavering; Proposition 103: The Feisty Chairman of 20th
Century Industries Drives Home His View Opposing Rebates for Motorists, L.A. TIMs, Sept. 22, 1992,
at B3; Kathleen Pender, Progressive Insurance Co. to Pay Prop. 103 Rebates, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 1992,
at B1.
98. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
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C. Cross-Subsidization
Forcing multi-line insurance companies to stay in the market and charge
rates below expected claims causes the insurers to subsidize auto insurance
with profits from other lines. Both California and New Jersey insurance
regulations contemplate that auto insurers will engage in such cross-
subsidization. A New Jersey statute forbids insurers from passing on to
consumers any of the charges the insurers are assessed to pay for the JUA
deficit.99 If insurers are dissatisfied with the rate of return from current
premiums, insurers may apply to the Insurance Commissioner for a higher rate
and pass some of the assessments on to the insureds. In determining whether
an insurer is entitled to a rate increase to reflect these assessments, the
Commissioner is allowed to consider, "[t]he insurer's experience on all lines
of its business in New Jersey."' I Even though the Commissioner is to assure
a fair rate of return, he can allow the insurance rates charged in other lines of
insurance to subsidize auto insurance.
California has allowed cross-subsidization in a less obvious way. The State
permits each insurer a profit of 10% of its reserves, but limits the amount of
actual reserves each insurer may use for this calculation.' 0' Reserves are the
funds an insurer has available to service claims. The trend has been toward
maintaining higher reserves because increasing auto insurance losses mean
more reserves are necessary to cover each policy.02 California thus risks
pushing insurers into insolvency. By failing to include all reserves for profit
calculation, it encourages maintenance of lower actual reserves.'0 3 Before
1988, auto insurance rates were determined by competition among the insurers.
The state now requires that insurers include in their profit calculations fewer
reserves than the insurers were maintaining voluntarily when their the state did
not control their profits. If a company chooses to keep higher reserves, auto
insurance will be subsidized by the other lines of insurance that the company
supplies, and, thus, by the companies' stockholders in the form of reduced
profits on the company's other lines of insurance.10
4
Regulators often force cross-subsidization in the public utilities
context.0" For example, regulators may require an electric utility to charge
99. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30A-16b (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
100. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 3-16.11(d)(1) (1991).
101. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2645.6 (1991).
102. In re Determination of Rate of Return, Leverage Factor, and Projected Yield for 1989 Rate
Calculations, File No. RCD-2 at 19-29 (Ins. Comm'n Ruling, Aug. 14, 1991).
103. See Jerry Geisel, Headaches at Home and Abroad: Political Ploys Endanger U.S. Insurance
Solvency, Warns Joint Meeting Panel, Bus. INS., Jan. 20, 1992, at 3 (discussing risk of insolvency when
insurers are forced to charge excessively low rates and predicting that more insurance companies will
withdraw from auto insurance market).
104. See Kertesz, supra note 78 (quoting insurers saying that California auto rates are so low that other
lines of insurance and insureds in other states will be forced to subsidize California auto insurance).
105. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 22, 40 (1971).
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the same rate to all customers even though it is more expensive to service
customers who are farther away from the plant. Although cross-subsidization
within public utilities may be undesirable,' 6 the effects of such distortions
are less evident than in the competitive insurance market. Public utilities are
given monopolies in their markets and thus will not be placed at a competitive
disadvantage in the market they use to subsidize the market that is generating
losses.
When multi-line insurance companies are forced to subsidize auto
insurance with profits from other lines, they must either charge higher prices
in those other markets or accept a lower overall rate of return on their capital.
If they do the latter, they ultimately will be unable to attract investors because
the return on the insurers' capital will be lower than other investments of
comparable risk. Yet, if they do the former, then companies that do not sell
auto insurance will be able to enter those markets and charge lower premiums,
since they do not have to subsidize the sale of auto insurance. This means that
if auto insurers are able to charge higher rates in other insurance markets, they
will only be able to do so for a short time. Thus, auto insurers will be forced
to use part of the profits they would normally earn from other lines of
insurance to subsidize the sale of auto insurance.
When a public utility is forced to cross-subsidize, it can make up for lost
profits by increasing prices in other markets because public utilities are
typically monopolies. For example, if a public utility is forced to charge all
consumers the same price even though servicing some consumers involves
greater cost, the utility can raise the price charged to all consumers since there
are no competitive forces in the market. Any consumer who wants the public
utility's service is required to pay the price charged. When withdrawal
restrictions prevent an auto insurance company from exiting the market by
withdrawal restrictions, the firm must resort to cross-subsidization and lower
profits. Public utilities are generally protected from insolvency by regulators,
whereas insurance companies are not. Automobile insurers operate under the
same constraints as public utilities but without commensurate protections.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WITHDRAWAL RESTRICTIONS
Not only are withdrawal regulations economically inefficient and
counterproductive, but courts should find them unconstitutional. States have a
legitimate interest in preserving insurance coverage for all drivers and
preventing disruption while insurers exit the market. However, the current
This article discusses the effects of cross-subsidization for utility type monopolies, but some of the
observations are relevant to the insurance context. Cross-subsidization provides a subsidy to auto insurance
from insureds in other states and from purchasers of other lines of insurance which is hidden from public
view. Id. at 43.
106. See id. at 43-44.
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regulations discussed above go too far. Forcing insurers to remain in the auto
insurance market violates substantive due process and represents an
unconstitutional taking.
The jurisprudence interpreting the Takings Clause and Substantive Due
Process rights is confusing and often contradictory.'0 7 Especially in the area
of rate regulation, there is disagreement among both courts and scholars over
whether the restraint on regulation comes from the takings clause or from
substantive due process doctrine. Since the Supreme Court has provided more
precedent in the takings area, most courts discuss takings and due process
analysis in tandem without distinguishing the two. 08 Despite the Court's
concentration on takings analysis, it is useful to consider the arguments
supporting a due process violation.
The withdrawal provisions in New Jersey and Massachusetts allow the
Insurance Commissioner to condition an auto insurer's withdrawal on the
surrender of its other insurance licenses within that state. Although insurers
have challenged most aspects of the withdrawal schemes imposed by these
states, this forfeiture condition is the most significant because of the financial
losses such provisions impose. Both the Massachusetts and New Jersey courts
have rejected challenges to such forfeiture provisions. In Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Commissioner of Ins.,"0 9 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
upheld the statute requiring the insurer to surrender all insurance licenses in
order to exit the auto insurance market. The court devoted only one sentence
to its rejection of the insurer's arguments that the law violated its due process
rights and was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. "We have
reviewed these arguments," the court stated, "and find that they are without
merit."'10
The New Jersey Supreme Court was more troubled by similar arguments
in In re "Plan for Orderly Withdrawal from New Jersey" of Twin City Fire
Ins. Co."1 Twin City Fire Insurance Company, a subsidiary of ITT Hartford,
challenged regulations forcing Twin City's affiliated insurance companies to
surrender their licenses to sell insurance in other lines if Twin City withdrew
from the auto insurance market. The insurer and amicus curiae made several
107. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis,
72 CAL. L. REv. 569 (1984); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566-69 (1984).
108. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 107 (criticizing court decisions in regulatory takings cases);
John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility Rate Regulation,
65 B.U. L. REV. 65 (1985) (discussing the Supreme Court's development of constitutional limits on
economic regulation); Sean P. Madden, Note, Takings Clause Analysis of Utility Ratemaking Decisions:
Measuring Hope's Investor Interest Factor, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (1989) (criticizing court
interpretations of return that public utilities must receive).
109. 363 N.E.2d 1087 (Mass. 1977).
110. Id. at 1099.
111. 609 A.2d 1248 (N.J. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993).
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challenges to the constitutionality of the provision,"' the strongest of which
were the claims that the forfeiture condition violated the insurer's substantive
due process rights and worked an unconstitutional taking of property without
compensation. The Massachusetts and New Jersey courts that have considered
these claims have decided them incorrectly.
A. Substantive Due Process
In Twin City, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the insurers' claims
that the withdrawal conditions violated the company's substantive due process
rights. The court drew on the substantive due process doctrine of the U.S.
Supreme Court: "[A] state statute does not violate substantive due process if
the statute reasonably relates to a legitimate legislative purpose and is not
arbitrary or discriminatory."' 1 3 The Twin City court refused to label the
withdrawal regulations arbitrary or discriminatory because it would be
"inequitable" for "an insurer who enjoyed profitable operations during the
pre-Reform Act period [to] abandon entirely the remedial burdens imposed by
the Act on all private-passenger insurers."' 14 The court determined that New
Jersey had a compelling interest in preventing insurers from leaving the state
and that the forfeiture condition reasonably accomplished state goals." 5
Although the court initially advanced the New Jersey Insurance
Commissioner's justifications supporting the withdrawal provisions, it did not
specify which line of reasoning supported its finding that the provisions were
not arbitrary and discriminatory. The Commissioner offered two justifications
for imposing the forfeiture condition on automobile insurers. First, the
Commissioner condemned as unfair the insurers' attempts to leave the state's
auto insurance market while profiting on other lines of insurance." 6 Second,
the Commissioner contended that because auto insurers enjoyed favorable
operating conditions in the past, they should not be allowed to abandon the
market when it becomes unprofitable." 7
112. The insurers and amicus curiae made other claims which are not as strong as the two claims
discussed in the text. These include: 1) the regulation forcing an auto insurer to try to place its insureds
with another carrier for five years is an unconstitutional taking; 2) the regulation requiring insurers
withdrawing from the market to continue to accept new insureds from the depopulation of the MTF until
they have formally withdrawn is a violation of due process; 3) the forfeiture condition violates the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine; 4) the application of the regulations violates Twin City's equal
protection rights. Id. at 1253-54, 1260-61, 1265.
113. In re "Plan for Orderly Withdrawal from New Jersey" of Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 609 A.2d 1248,
1258 (NJ. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993) (quoting Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294
(NJ. 1985)). U.S. Supreme Court cases also use the arbitrary and irrational standard. See Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82-84 (1978); Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S.
1, 15 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
114. Twin City, 609 A.2d at 1259.
115. Id. at 1260.
116. Id. at 1257.
117. Id. at 1259.
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Neither of these arguments is tenable. The Commissioner's first line of
reasoning fails because New Jersey regulations arbitrarily single out automobile
insurers from among all insurers to subsidize the sale of auto insurance. The
court found it unfair for auto insurers to profit on other lines while
withdrawing from covering drivers. Under this reasoning, the regulations
should require all insurers to sell to drivers in order to do any business in the
state. Multi-line insurers who sell auto insurance operate at a disadvantage
when compared with insurers only servicing other lines.
Second, the Commissioner argued that fairness requires auto insurers who
have previously earned profits in the New Jersey auto insurance market to bear
the burden of these new regulations. However, it is not "inequitable" for
insurers to earn income when market conditions are favorable and to exit when
business is no longer profitable. Private business exists to earn profits for its
investors. If New Jersey wants private auto insurers to continue to operate in
the state, the legislature should create a regulatory climate more favorable to
insurers.
The Commissioner has submitted a third justification, though one not
discussed in this case, to justify singling out auto insurers. The Commissioner
has suggested that because auto insurer mismanagement produced the large
JUA deficit, auto insurers should remain in the market until the state resolves
its auto insurance problems. 18 This rationale is untenable as well. The New
Jersey Department of Insurance determined that the JUA deficit and high auto
insurance premiums derived mainly from the number of cars, the level of
legally required coverage, the maintenance of low rates for high-risk drivers
that populated the JUA, and other regulation-related factors." 9 New Jersey
insurers did not create these problems. If the regulators consider insurers to be
at fault, then New Jersey should bring legal action. Without a judicial
determination of liability, the Insurance Commissioner has no right to collect
damages from the auto insurers.
B. Takings
The forfeiture condition also works an unconstitutional taking of property
without compensation. In Twin City, the New Jersey court discussed U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, including the leading regulatory takings cases,' 20
and noted that in the "handful of cases involving regulatory 'takings' of
commercial property interests other than land, the Court generally has been
118. 1989-1 NAIC PROC., supra note 12, at 5.
119. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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reluctant to conclude that compensation is required."'121 The Twin City court
applied a three-factor balancing test to determine whether a compensable
taking had occurred, considering: "the character of the governmental
action,122 the economic impact of the regulation, and whether the regulation
interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations."' 3 Concluding
that the regulation satisfies the significant public interest of keeping auto
insurers in New Jersey, the court found that the first factor supported the
constitutionality of regulation. However, without evidence, the court could not
determine the extent of the insurers' losses from enforced surrender of their
licenses. Finally, it concluded that the third factor, the insurers' expectations,
"lends itself to either side of the argument."'
124
Contrary to the Twin City court's conclusion, the state's withdrawal
regulations bear no rational relation to an attempt to make auto insurance
available to New Jersey residents. The conditions imposed will not keep other
insurers from abandoning the market. As insurers start exiting the market,
drivers will have to find coverage from the remaining insurers. In addition, the
number of remaining insurers will decrease as the state continues to depopulate
the MTF. Initially, the remaining companies might possibly increase their
earnings by absorbing profitable nonauto insurance business from departing
companies. However, these increased profits will disappear in the face of
losses from taking on a larger share of the unprofitable auto insurance
business. In addition, insurers who do not service the auto insurance market
may well pick up the nonauto insurance lines of withdrawing insurers.
The Commissioner's suggestion that the new business available will attract
insurance companies to serve the auto insurance industry'25 demonstrates the
fallacy of the state's scheme. A new entrant to the New Jersey market will sell
only the profitable types of insurance that the regulations force Twin City to
abandon. Because regulations make the auto insurance market unprofitable, no
new insurers will enter that market.
Even assuming arguendo that the policy achieves a significant public
interest, the other two factors outweigh the interest test. The regulation has a
significant, adverse economic impact. The court "[took] for granted ... that
the surrender by Twin City's affiliates of their respective licenses would not
necessarily result in the elimination of all commercial value."' 26 However,
contrary to the court's assumption, other insurers will have no need to buy
Twin City's affiliates' business because they can obtain it free once regulators
121. Twin City, 609 A.2d at 1263 (citations omitted).
122. The court interpreted this factor to mean that the state's action must further a substantial state
interest. Id.
123. Id. at 1262 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 1264.
125. Id. at 1257.
126. Id. at 1264.
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force Twin City to leave the market. An insurer will suffer a substantial
economic impact from its affiliates' surrender of their licenses. Moreover, the
insurers have a reasonable investment-backed expectation of a fair rate of
return. They had no opportunity to surrender their auto insurance license before
the regulations went into effect, and the insurers had no notice that the state
would link the sale of auto insurance to other licenses.
C. Basis for Determining Profitability
In order to determine if there has been a taking, courts must determine the
economic impact of the withdrawal regulations. To do this, they must decide
the basis for determining profitability. In the Twin City case, New Jersey
regulators argued for the constitutionality of withdrawal restrictions by pointing
to Twin City's profits on its nationwide automobile insurance. 27 The court
summarized the Commissioner's claims, stating:
The Commissioner pointed out that Twin City's automobile-insurance
business historically had been profitable on a national basis, that he
assumed that Twin City's automobile business would continue to be
profitable under the Reform Act, and that he did not accept Twin
City's assertion that its automobile business would be
unprofitable. 128
Neither the court nor the Commissioner explained why the company's
nationwide automobile insurance profits were the relevant measure. Since the
court focused on the forfeiture condition, lines of insurance sold within New
Jersey presented a more obvious basis for measuring profits. The courts have
avoided this question of basis and failed to define a general rule for computing
reasonable rates of return in takings cases. When courts determine whether an
auto insurer is receiving a fair rate of return, they should measure the return
from the auto insurance line in one state only. Measuring the rate of return by
the insurer's operations as a whole creates inefficient cross-subsidies and puts
auto insurers at a competitive disadvantage.2 9
The courts that have examined state assessment plans and withdrawal
restrictions have affirmed that insurers must be guaranteed a fair rate of return,
although they have not specified the components of that rate. In State Farm,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, quoting FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
30
stated that a fair rate of return "'should be commensurate with returns on
investments in other enterprises having corresponding risk.' "13' However, the
court also said that "while government regulation cannot wreak too great an
127. Id. at 1257.
128. Id.
129. See supra Part III(C).
130. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
131. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191, 199 (N.J. 1991) (citations omitted).
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interference with 'distinct investment-backed expectations,' a participant in a
highly regulated industry must anticipate that its profit levels can be capped or
even reduced by changes in government regulation. There is no constitutional
entitlement to maximum profits."'' 32 The issue of the proper unit for
measuring return has not been considered in the context of the regulation of
insurance. In In re Aetna, a New Jersey court said that an insurer does not
have a "right to make money on every policy written, or on every day of
business."'' 33 However, the New Jersey Supreme Court has also held that
insurance companies are entitled to a level of profit that is "adequate to attract
and retain invested capital."'1
34
The U.S. Supreme Court has not specified the basis for determining
whether a taking has occurred within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. In
several of the leading takings cases, the Court has failed to define clearly a
method for measuring the diminution of value. 35 As Justice Scalia recently
stated for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
t3 6
[T]he rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasible
use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make
clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be
measured. When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to
leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we
would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of
the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution
in value of the tract as a whole.
37
An examination of the major takings cases confirms Justice Scalia's
statement. One of the most important regulatory takings cases, Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,138 used the property being taken as the measure of the
loss. The case involved a Pennsylvania statute which barred coal mining that
resulted in the subsidence of any land supporting housing or certain public
facilities not owned by the coal company, even when the coal company owned
the right of support to the land. As the basis for computing the diminution in
value, Justice Holmes' majority opinion used the value of the coal the
company was forced to leave in the ground. '"To make it commercially
132. Id. at 200.
133. In re Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 591 A.2d 631, 642 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), cert.
denied, 599 A.2d 162 (NJ. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fortunato, 112 S. Ct. 1244
(1992).
134. State Farm, 590 A.2d at 199 (NJ. 1991). In addition, when considering Proposition 103, the
Supreme Court of California mandated insurers' entitlement to a fair rate of return on their investment.
Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1255 (Cal. 1989).
135. See Rose, supra note 107 (summarizing inconsistencies in Court's diminution in value test).
136. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
137. Id. at 2894 n.7.
138. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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impracticable to mine certain coal," Holmes reasoned, "has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.'
139
In dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that when evaluating the severity of a
diminution of value in order to determine whether a taking has occurred, the
court should consider the value of the coal relative to the value of the land as
a whole rather than merely the value of the coal that must be left in the
ground. 1
40
This area of the law has remained confused for the balance of the century.
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,'41 the Court found that
a coal company deprived of the right to mine a portion of its land did not
show that there was sufficient diminution in value to constitute a taking. The
Court refused to consider the coal required to be left in the ground as the
relevant basis, as had been done in Pennsylvania Coal, and instead looked to
the company's total mining operations as the basis for determining the
diminution in value. Similarly, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York,'42 the Court approved the New York City Landmark Commission's
prohibition on the construction of an office tower above Grand Central
Terminal because the station was still economically viable in its traditional use.
The Court used the station's profits as a whole, and not the lost profits from
the company's inability to use the airspace, as the basis for determining the
loss.
Although recent cases have found a broader basis than that used in
Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Scalia's recent mention in Lucas of the
inconsistency in the Court's decisions may signal future reconsideration.
Justice Scalia may have further signalled a changing attitude when he
described as "unsupportable" the view of the New York Court of Appeals
quoted in Penn Central:
For an extreme-and, we think, unsupportable-view of the relevant
calculus, see Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City...
where the state court examined the diminution in a particular parcel's
value produced by a municipal ordinance in light of total value of the
taking claimant's other holdings in the vicinity. 43
Courts have abdicated their responsibility to provide a workable standard.
Takings analysis should not depend on the overall income of the property
owner or business proprietor. The basis for determining whether a deprivation
of property is a "taking" should be the value of the property itself, that piece
of beach or line of business, because it will demonstrate the true impact of the
139. Id. at 414.
140. Id. at 419.
141. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
142. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
143. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992) (citations omitted).
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regulators' decisions. The economic impact of regulating away the profitability
of an entire line of business, auto insurance, imposes a dire penalty on insurers
in that line and produces perverse economic incentives that distort the
insurance market and render it inefficient.
V. CONCLUSION
Withdrawal restrictions have a detrimental effect on the auto insurance
market. While legislators may seek to make insurance available and affordable,
withdrawal restrictions only make the fulfillment of this goal less likely. In the
long run, these regulations will make insurance harder to obtain and more
expensive. The costs that these regulations impose will discourage new firms
from entering the market and will encourage insurers presently in the business
to exit as soon as possible.
The courts should find that the forfeiture condition in New Jersey's and
Massachusetts' withdrawal regulations violates the insurer's due process rights
and works an unconstitutional taking. By compelling insurers to supply auto
insurance below cost, current rate regulations force insurers to supply a public
service without compensation. When measuring whether insurers are receiving
a fair rate of return, courts should designate the company's return on auto
insurance in one state, not its aggregate return on all lines, as the relevant unit.
Legislatures need a comprehensive plan to deal with the crisis in auto
insurance. Rising insurance costs and premiums force drivers into the
involuntary market and increase the amount of subsidization. States will not
achieve their goals of available and affordable insurance for all drivers by
forcing insurance companies to supply auto insurance below cost.
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